简介:TheVaR,anewappearingfinancialrisk-managetool,havebeenappliedwidely.ManyfinancialsetupshaveaccustomedtomeasuretheriskofaportfoliowiththeVaR.SoitisverynecessarytodiscusstheportfoliochoiceproblemundertheVaRconstraint.Inthispaper,bysettingandsolvingtheportfoliochoicemodelundertheVaRconstraint,weillustratethattheuseoftheVaRconstraintreducesthearrayofchoicetoamoremanageablerange.TheprobabilityoftragetVaR,therefore,canbethoughtofasarisktoleranceassessmenttool(whencoupledwithanothermeasureofrisk).
简介:为一家企业建模匹配它的顾客察觉了(并且需要的顾客)结果,仍然是一项进行中的任务。这篇论文考虑表演网络(SVN)接近的服务价值可能怎么样,答应当模特儿,;交付,前端企业理解;它与的直接约会它的立即(或前端)顾客。这些前端顾客可以是任何一个:(1)它的离线,在里面店顾客—与企业出售职员一起直接从事(或代表),或(2)它的联机、虚拟顾客—经由因特网或遥远的存取与企业从事。处于这种状况,两企业,;顾客利用他们的各自的观点,;双方影响相互作用。对这些企业外部;顾客影响是捕获的另外的因素立即;更宽广的全球效果—称为的环境效果。影响的这三个生意顾客约会区域被一条SVNSEM途径捕获。没有一个生意顾客,某类型遇到一家服务企业的可能性,;一个勘探顾客,成功地从事一个交换过程被减少。这交换可以是一物理,;/or服务交换,;/or一个信息;/or想法交换。到企业,实际上,这相遇是一项贸易,;作为结果,企业指向获得将最终交付一张网的经济交换积极经济结果。到顾客,外部;内部信息喂,满足,察觉的价值,;满足,是关键相遇司机。SVN提供一个新方法理解生意顾客相遇,;为了然后利用,这获得了知识到也:(1)造一个战略管理模型,或(2)reengineer它的企业网络,;然后创造重新定位的、更排列顾客的企业操作—能够交付胜利的—赢,竞争生意顾客答案。
简介:Whilelastdecadehaswitnessedarapidgrowthofdigitaleconomy,thereislimitedunderstandinginliteratureonwhethertheconventionalwisdomonpricingstrategystillholdsforinformationgoods.Ononehand,informationgoods,similartodurablegoods,aresubjecttovaluedepreciation;ontheother,theydifferfromtraditionalgoodsinnegligiblemarginalcostandthesensitivitytosocialinfluences.Thispaperdevelopsatwo-period,game-theoreticmodeltoinvestigateoptimalpricingstrategyofinformationgoods.Ononedimension,twodifferentdepreciationmechanisms(self-andtime-depreciation)areconsidered;ontheother,twoprevalentpricingschemes(perpetuallicensingandsubscription-feemodels)arestudied.Weobtainclosed-formsolutionsinallscenarios.Ourfindingssuggestthatvendorsoftime-depreciationinformationgoodsshouldadoptsubscription-feemodeltoattractearlyadoptersandexploitsocialinfluences,whilethevendorsofself-depreciationinformationgoodsshouldstrategicallybalancebetweendepreciationandsocialinfluences.Interestingly,associalinfluencesbecomestrongenough,thedifferencebetweenpricingschemesdiminishesandthetradeoffbetweencandidatestrategiesvanishes.Wealsoextendthemodeltostaticpricinginwhichthevendorcommitstofutureprice.Wediscoverthatthesuperiorityofsubscription-feemodelmightbeoverturnedunderstaticpricing.Ourresultsabovealsoimplythatbuildingconsumerfeedbackandinteractionsystemscouldbehelpfulforminimizingthepotentiallossofasuboptimalpricingscheme.
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