简介：ThispaperpresentsacomparisonmechanismforasimpleprocurementauctionandgeneralizedNashbargainingsolutioninaprocurementcircumstance.Thebuyerwhohopestofulfillaprojecthastwooptions.First,shemayawardtheprojecttotheoldproviderwithanefficientqualitybybargaining.Second,shemaygivetheprojecttothefirmwhosubmitsthelowestbidthroughasimpleprocurementsecond-pricesealed-bidauctionwithapre-fixedquality.Wecomparetheexpectedrevenueintheauctionwiththedeterministicprofitofthebargaining.Indifferentparameterscases,wefindtheborderlinefunctionsbetweenthetwooptionswithrespecttothebuyer’sbargainingpowerandtheamountofbidders.Wealsocompareoursimpleprocurementauction(SPA)withtheoptimalmultidimensionalbidauctionbyChe(1993),andfindourmodelprotectsthebuyer’sprivatevaluationinformationbyforfeitingsomeprofits.Somepropertiesofthedifferencebetweenthetwoauctionsareproposed,especiallythereisnorevenuedifferencewhentheamountofbiddersapproachesinfinity.

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简介：Weconsideranewsvendorproblemwithprice-dependentdemand,ineitheradditiveormultiplicativeformat.Thenewsvendorhastwomodesofpurchasing:regularorderingatthebeginningofthesellingseasonandemergencyordering(iftherealizeddemandexceedstheinitialorderquantity)attheendofthesellingseason.Bystochasticcomparisons,wesystematicallyinvestigatetheeffectsofdemandmagnitudeanddemandrandomnessonpricingandorderingquantitydecisionsaswellasexpectedprofitofthenewsvendor,underbothusualstochasticorder(firstorderstochasticdominance)andconvexorder(lessvariable).Ourkeyfindingsinclude:(i)incontrarytothecasewherepriceisexogenous,astochasticallylargerdemandshockmayevenleadtoalowerorderquantity;(ii)astochasticallylargerdemandshockleadstoahigherpricefortheadditivedemandcase,butmayleadtoalowerpriceforthemultiplicativedemandcase;(iii)astochasticallylargerdemandshockleadstoahigherexpectedprofitforbothdemandmodels;(iv)ingeneral,alessvariabledemandleadstoahigherexpectedprofitforbothdemandmodels;andfurthermore,alessvariabledemandshockhasnoeffectonpricefortheadditivedemandmodel,butleadstoahigherpriceforthemultiplicativedemandmodel.Theimplicationsofallthesefindingsforpricingandorderquantityarediscussedindetail.

简介：Inthispaper,weconsideranewsvendormodelinwhicharisk-aversemanagerfacesastochasticprice-dependentdemandineitheranadditiveoramultiplicativeform.Anemergencypurchaseoptionisallowedaftertherealizationofdemandtosatisfytheunitsthatareshort.Byadoptingconditionalvalue-at-risk(CVaR)asthedecisioncriterion,weaimtoinvestigatetheoptimalpricingandorderingdecisions,andtheeffectsofparameterchangesinsuchasetting.Weprovidesufficientconditionsfortheuniquenessoftheoptimalpolicyforbothdemandmodels.Weperformcomparativestaticsanalysistoshowhowtheoptimalpricingandorderingdecisionbehaveswhenchangingparameters.WealsocompareourresultswiththoseofthenewsvendorwithageneralutilityfunctionandwithCVaRcriterionunderlostsalesassumption.Ourkeyresultsinclude:(i)Forbothdemandmodels,theoptimalsellingpriceisdecreasinginriskaversion.Hence,theoptimalpriceofarisk-aversenewsvendorisnotgreaterthantheoptimalpriceofarisk-neutralnewsvendor.(ii)Incontrarytothelostsalescase,forthemultiplicativedemandmodel,theoptimalorderquantitymaynotbemonotonicinriskaversion.Consequently,theoptimalrisk-averseorderquantitymaybelowerorhigherthantheoptimalrisk-neutralcounterpart.(iii)Fortheadditivemodel,theoptimalorderquantityisstrictlyincreasingintheemergencypurchaseprice,whileforthemultiplicativemodeltheoptimalorderquantityhasnosuchamonotonicproperty.Somenumericalexamplesareconductedtoverifyourclaimsandgainmoreinsightsabouttherisk-aversedecision-makingbehaviors.